Abstract: This article investigates the function and reality of language in Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. How can one interpret the systems-theoretical assumption that language is based on communication? Luhmann describes language as a dynamic media/form relationship, which is able to couple the social and psychological system. This structural coupling, which constructs consciousness and language as two autonomous systems, raises problems if one defines language from a cognitive point of view. This article discusses these problems and aims to develop assumptions and questions within the systems-theoretical approach.
Introduction
Although well known for his prolific scholarly productivity, Niklas Luhmann granted only rhapsodic asides to the topic of language. In quantitative terms alone, language would have to pervade at least some of his works (LUHMANN 1987: 209ff .; LUHMANN Pandaemonium germanicum 16/2010.2, p. 1 -21 -www.fflch.usp.br/dlm/alemao/pandaemoniumgermanicum
Communication and Consciousness
The Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie [Historical Dictionary of Philosophy] sketches the history of the impact of the concept -communication‖ and shows that above all it is the etymological meaning of communication that is crucial for the traditional understanding of this category: -Since antiquity, the Latin word ‗communicatio' has had a broad range of meanings within the radius of utterance, permission-granting, connection, exchange, circulation, association, and community‖ (STERNSCHULTE 1976: 893) . 4 This conception points to an intersubjective transmission of messages within a community in which subjects interact with one another by communicating. But this is exactly the conception criticized by systemstheory: -The metaphor of transmission is unusable because it implies too much ontology‖ (LUHMANN 1995, 139 is the processing of selection‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 140) . 6 By linking communication with observation, the former comes to be regarded as a complex undertaking insofar as social systems, or rather the communications thereof, can mutually observe one another. Observing is no longer the exclusive performance of a psychic system, but an abstract procedure. By means of its capacity for observation, communication can be considered as a process full of events, in which momentary decisions are made about what is being communicated. The unmarked communications are always already inherent within this process. In this way, one can always understand communication as a unity of difference.
It is not without reason that Luhmann makes an ironic allusion to the original fall of man in the following passage about communication: -Once embroiled in communication, one can never return to the paradise of innocent souls‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 150) . 7 Communication does indeed appear to possess diabolical characteristics.
Imagine the following situation: the devil observes God. In so doing, he is observing something that does not allow itself to be observed, because God constitutes the presupposition of the distinguishableness of the devil himself, and to that extent is unobservable. If, in spite of this, the devil observes God, he generates a difference and comes to observe the unity of a difference in place of an unmarked unity.
Communication can also, like the devil, mark the unity of a difference. The decision as to which side of an observation should be marked is left to the -laws‖ of contingency, which does not mean that communication takes place in a purely arbitrary or chaotic manner. Contingency rather implies that the possible and the real are respectively thematized in the drawing of a distinction: -Something is contingent insofar as it is neither necessary nor impossible; it is just what it is (or was or will be), though it could also be otherwise‖ (LUHMANN 1995: 106 communication. Yet the dependence in question here does not rest on a mutual openness. As an autopoietic system, the psychic system can only connect to its own operations. The elements thereof, its thoughts and ideas, can only refer to themselves.
Thus one thought within the system can only connect to another thought within that same system and not immediately to the thought of another psychic system. In order to transport thoughts from one psychic system to another, one needs communication to occur between at least two psychic systems present to each other. The psychic systems constitute a kind of -fuel‖, in that they supply the communicative process with thought material that must be -transcribed‖ by communication.
Language and Structural Coupling
How is it that thoughts and ideas can be -transcribed‖ for the communicative process?
It is here that language plays a decisive role due to its capacity for coupling the social and psychic systems. Again, the notion that language presents an element of consciousness or that it emerges from elements of the psychic system such as thoughts another in open and closed ways at the same time. The mutual externality of one system to the other is the necessary and constitutive conditionality of each. The communicative system is based on a chain of communicative events, which must be continuously supplied with new elements. The innovative elements stemming from outside the system that are necessary for the self-preservation of the system cannot take shape without the system's referring to externals.
In this relationship of dependence, language plays an important role due to its ability to present units of both consciousness and communication in such a way that both systems can refer to these in their own ways. But this is not an exchange that takes place between the two systems. They remain respectively unchanged. A key term for understanding this relationship is the word -captivate.‖ Language has the capacity to captivate consciousness and communication. It is not that language is thereby considered an internal element of the system, but rather a medium through which these systems can be connected. Language constitutes a -juncture‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) 14 between consciousness and communication that serves as a catalyst for each system to use the operations of the other for its own development. Language can captivate consciousness in such a way as to totally absorb the latter: -And in the same way, linguistic communication can captivate the consciousness participating in it in such a way as to allow communication to move freely without having to repeatedly reassure itself of whether people are paying attention and taking note of what is being said‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) . 15 Luhmann refers to reading as an example of this:
-Whoever reads is practically inhibited thereby and simply has to stop reading whenever he becomes tired. While speaking or listening, writing or reading, one's 14 -Nahtstelle‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) 15 -Und ebenso kann die sprachliche Kommunikation das teilnehmende Bewusstsein derart fesseln, dass die Kommunikation sich frei bewegen kann, ohne sich ständig thematisch zu vergewissern, ob die Leute noch aufpassen und sich merken, was gesagt wird‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) .
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In reading a book, one is (ideally) so absorbed therein that he/she blocks out his/her own thoughts, which would otherwise interfere with the participation in the communicative process of reading. Consciousness is then so preoccupied with language that one's thoughts and ideas are fixated only on the communicative event.
The elements of communication -information, utterance, and understanding -must be synthesized to facilitate further connecting communications. The thoughts of readers play no determining role here, because consciousness, which selects one way or the other, is not deciding about communication. Communication itself is deciding.
Nonetheless, consciousness plays a necessary role in the communicative process, which would not be possible at all without it.
Consciousness's constitutive share in communication arises from perception.
Perception is a -special competency of consciousness‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 17) 17 and is a non-communicative event of consciousness. Without perception, nothing can be conveyed as having been perceived, which implies that communication depends on perception. Language can stimulate and irritate consciousness, by making -conspicuous objects of perception‖ (LUHMANN 1993: 48) 18 available. The objects of perception that can irritate consciousness are words that meet special criteria: -They may not present any similarity to other perceivable objects (sounds, images, etc.); for that would cause them to continually seep back into the world of perception and disappear therein‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 48) . 19 Words must be specifically constituted so as to not be reduced back into the world of perception. This also means that their characteristics must be constantly preserved so that they are always utilizable. Only 16 -Wer überhaupt liest, ist dadurch praktisch blockiert und muss, wenn er müde wird, eben aufhören zu lesen. Beim Reden wie beim Zuhören, beim Schreiben wie beim Lesen ist das eigene Denken weitgehend ausgeschaltet, sonst verliert man den Faden‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 49) .
17 -Spezialkompetenz des Bewusstseins‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 17) 18 -auffällige Wahrnehmungsgegenstände‖ (LUHMANN 1993: 48) 19 -Sie dürfen keinerlei Ähnlichkeit mit sonst wahrnehmbaren Gegenständen (Geräuschen, Bildern etc.) aufweisen; denn das würde bewirken, dass sie ständig in die Wahrnehmungswelt wieder einsickern und verloren gehen‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 48 Words must meet further criteria: -The perceivable artefacts of language must not only captivate, they must also trigger imagination in controllable ways‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 49) . 21 Here, Luhmann is developing suggestions from psycholinguistics to substantiate his thesis about language's forms: words are based on prototypes that have settled within consciousness over the course of evolution. Every word can trigger an association on the basis of which the imagination circles around an identical semantic field and words are thereby stamped with -typicality‖ and distinguish themselves through characteristics. Hence, for systems-theory, language serves as a catalyst for consciousness to process certain thoughts or ideas according to the regularities which govern language-use.
On the other hand, language can also captivate communication. As mentioned above, language can optimize communication by allowing it to draw on an extensive capacity for making distinctions.
[Language] has the peculiar ability to practically compel a distinction between utterance and information, for whenever one uses language, one can […] not easily deny an intent to communicate; and at the same time, -Medium in this sense is every loosely coupled relation of elements that is disposed to being formed‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53) . 25 A medium does not embody a material substance, which can assume different forms, rather medium describes formed possibilities that make forms possible. To take a concrete example: air and light serve as media of perception. A medium is not to be conceived as an independent unity, but rather in relationship to form. Further, the relationship to form represents no closed or harmonic unity. 26 A medium must be grasped as a difference of the form: -In addition to that, while being bound by form, the medium must be preserved as a medium even as it is ‗deformed' by the form‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 53 To what extent can one understand language as a medium in this way?
Language is not a medium in terms of the -physical quality of its signs nor in the conscious states of its speakers and listeners, readers and writers‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 54) . 30 As a medium, language is neither a conglomeration of signs or thoughts, which can be articulated as words and sentences, nor can it be understood as a signifying system. The medial aspects of language consist in the autopoiesis of communication,
for which the structural coupling of communication and consciousness is the preconditon.
[Language] has its basis far more in the following: that the numerous structurally determined systems of consciousness are operatively closed and thus operate with regard to one another only in accidental, occasional, and loosely coupled ways. The operatively necessary separation amidst possible congruence, primarily of perceiving, offers the possibility for constituting language as a medium and, in this medium, constituting self-generated forms, namely sentences. (LUHMANN 1994: 54) words, language can allow forms to be generated, that is, sentences to be formed. This does not only have a -binding effect‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 55) 32 on the psychic and communicative systems. It also allows the two systems to constitute themselves vis-à-vis one another. By means of providing for the structural coupling, language places the two systems in a constitutive relationship. Language contributes to the differentiation of the psychic and communicative systems by allowing boundaries to be established that are constitutive of the systems: -It is through language that the constitution of consciousness and the constitution of society are possible in the first place‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47) . 33 It is not that language marks a boundary between language and non-language, -but rather a multitude of systemic boundaries according konstituieren und in diesem Medium dann selbstgenerierte Formen, nämlich Sätze zu bilden‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 54) . 32 -Bindungseffekt‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 55) 33 -Über Sprache wird Bewusstseinsbildung und Gesellschaftsbildung überhaupt erst möglich‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 47 For example, two taxis colliding into each other on the street can irritate a perceiving psychic system. The psychic system carries out a selective perception: it sees the accident. When, later, the psychic system tells another psychic system about the accident, the one gives the other selective information: -Two taxis collided into each other on the street.‖ The other psychic system is irritated by the information uttered. It makes a claim on his consciousness. -Ideally,‖ this consciousness understands that two taxis have collided. Only at this moment does communication take place upon the participation of consciousness in the medium of language.
Language takes part in both systems and has served as a catalyst to each, without changing anything with regard to the difference between the two systems.
As a medium, language embodies a -non-system‖ that generates systemic
constructions. To what extent can one describe its reality in such terms? The reality of language no longer rests on a model of substance that inquires into the -essence,‖ the -what‖ of the phenomenon. Systems-theory prohibits such an approach to questions about substance. Furthermore, language does not consist of a conglomeration of signs:
-Nor do we follow the semiotic theory of language. Language is not a system of signs for non-linguistic relations of things‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51) . 35 With that, Luhmann criticizes the conception of linguistics in that he does not allow for words and sentences to be understood in terms of their use as signs that are constitutive of linguistic communication. Words and sentences can indeed function as signs, but they are not the material of linguistic communication. The reality of language rather consists in its use: -It is completely sufficient to state that language exists concretely in its use as language and by extension in its being observed as language by an 34 -sondern eine Vielheit von Systemgrenzen je nachdem, was kommunikativ und bewusstseinsmäßig gelingt‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51) .
35 -Ebenso wenig folgen wir der semiotischen Sprachtheorie. Sprache ist kein System von Zeichen für aussersprachliche Sachverhalte‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 51) .
Pandaemonium germanicum 16/2010.2, p. 1 -21 -www.fflch.usp.br/dlm/alemao/pandaemoniumgermanicum observer‖ (LUHMANN 1994: 52) . 36 Its reality thus consists in its being able to be observed and not in its function to represent something that is independent thereof. It is the capacity of language to distinguish which observation describes its reality and in this way it defers to consciousness. It is indeed possible that language irritates consciousness by making conspicuous claims on it, but language does not possess any conscious-like qualities. Systems-theory's separation of consciousness and language renders numerous other theories, which deal with the connections between the constitution of the subject, cognition, language and understanding, vulnerable to criticism. 
Problems and open questions about Luhmann's conception of language
Further reflection on Luhmann's separation of language and consciousness reveals problems with his argument: he describes perception as a function of the psychic system. By means of perception, consciousness can perceive things in its environment, whereby these appear to consciousness as immediately given. In fact, however, consciousness relies on the brain's own complexity, which construes an image of the external world for consciousness in its own way: -The brain represses, if you will, its own work in order to make the world appear as a world‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 6 consciousness, but it cannot change anything about the latter's structure. Is the claim about perception's being structured by language one of the paradoxes Luhmann builds into his argumentative procedure or is there a lack of precision in the separation of language and consciousness? At this point of Luhman's argumentation, a more precise explanation as to how to conceive of the relationship between pre-structuration and structuration is lacking. In my view, the lack of clarity here points to a more fundamental problem of systems-theory: this is the rigid separation of language and consciousness itself. If one follows Luhmann's argument about the difference between language and consciousness, language can in no way emerge within consciousness.
Luhmann does not undertake any attempt to examine the cognitive conditions through which language may originate: -We presuppose language as given‖ 39 -Ebenso ist bekannt, wie stark Wahrnehmung durch Sprache vorstrukturiert wird‖ (LUHMANN 1997: 15) .
Pandaemonium germanicum 16/2010.2, p. 1 -21 -www.fflch.usp.br/dlm/alemao/pandaemoniumgermanicum (LUHMANN 2000: 16) . 40 To this point, he adds a footnote: -We are not investigating, in Kantian fashion, the conditions of possibility for language, nor are we conducting a Darwinian inquiry into the evolution of language‖ (LUHMANN 2000: 323) . 41 In his writings, Luhmann works purposefully on perception, consciousness and communication, with an emphasis on reconstructing the relation between the subject and society.
Yet, because language is subject to cognitive evolution, an account of which is crucial to understanding the phenomenon of language, the omission of questions as to the conditions of language's origination remains problematic. In his discussion of language, Luhmann only refers to the question of social evolution. But an analysis of language cannot do without an explanation of its cognitive evolution. It is not a matter of returning to questions that are caught up in the philosophy of the subject, but rather the need to connect an analysis of language to cognitive processes. What disadvantages would systems-theory incur by treating language in conjunction with cognitive evolution? Luhmann primarily focuses on the phenomenon of social evolution with regard to language, whereby his view of society's development departs significantly from traditional models of evolution. In systems-theory, evolution is understood to presuppose itself in that the development of autopoietic systems rests on their self-selective decoupling from their environments. With that, Luhmann distances himself from mutation as a basic principle of evolutionary theory. The basis for evolution no longer consists in unexpected events, since only contingent events occur within the environment of a system. In systems-theory, evolution depends on whether a system allows itself to be irritated by an event to such an extent that the system is structurally transformed.
The theory of evolution deploys a specific distinction, namely, the distinction between variety, selection, and restabilization. This line of questioning does
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Evolution is an event in which autopoietic systems perceive events in their environments that appear arbitrary and new. Luhmann describes this moment as variation. Variations can serve as catalysts for the system to transform itself structurally or rather to make so-called selections, which prove or do not prove capable of stabilizing themselves. Evolution does not thereby describe a development that is teleologically driven. On the contrary, it proceeds erratically. Why does systems-theory not attempt to address the phenomenon of the cognitive development of language according to its own concept of evolution? Instead, language is treated only as an epiphenomenon of the evolution of society, without addressing its evolution in the context of its cognitive capacities and the question of consciousness.
The role of language in society and its social evolution is only important to Luhmann with regard to the development of the media technologies of modern society. Written language presents an increase in the complexity of language, because it is supported by optic and acoustic perception, which can lead to a further differentiation of The danger here is that he overemphasizes the category of the social in analogy to the tradition that placed consciousness at the center of social life. The concept of communication in systems-theory threatens to work against its own polycentric demand by allowing communication to take the place of the center. There is a selfobservation missing here, in lieu of which the theory's tendency to overdetermining the category of the social is accentuated.
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